Computer theorem proving in math by Simpson, Carlos T.
ar
X
iv
:m
at
h/
03
11
26
0v
2 
 [m
ath
.H
O]
  2
0 F
eb
 20
04
COMPUTER THEOREM PROVING IN MATH
CARLOS SIMPSON
Abstract. We give an overview of issues surrounding computer-
verified theorem proving in the standard pure-mathematical con-
text.
1. Introduction
When I was taking Wilfried Schmid’s class on variations of Hodge
structure, he came in one day and said “ok, today we’re going to calcu-
late the sign of the curvature of the classifying space in the horizontal
directions”. This is of course the key point in the whole theory: the
negative curvature in these directions leads to all sorts of important
things such as the distance decreasing property.
So Wilfried started out the calculation, and when he came to the
end of the first double-blackboard, he took the answer at the bottom
right and recopied it at the upper left, then stood back and said “lets
verify what’s written down before we erase it”. Verification made (and
eventually, sign changed) he erased the board and started in anew.
Four or five double blackboards later, we got to the answer. It was
negative.
Proof is the fundamental concept underlying mathematical research.
In the exploratory mode, it is the main tool by which we percieve the
mathematical world as it really is rather than as we would like it to be.
Inventively, proof is used for validation of ideas: one uses them to prove
something nontrivial, which is valid only if the proof is correct. Other
methods of validation exist, for example showing that an idea leads to
computational predictions—but they often generate proof obligations
too. Unfortunately, the need to prove things is the factor which slows
us down the most too.
It has recently become possible, and also necessary, to imagine a
full-fledged machine-verification system for mathematical proof. This
might radically change many aspects of mathematical research—for
Key words and phrases. Lambda calculus, Type theory, Theorem proving, Veri-
fication, Set theory.
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better or for worse is a matter of opinion. At such a juncture it is
crucial that standard pure mathematicians participate.
The present paper is intended to supply a synthetic contribution to
the subject. Most, or probably all, is not anything new (and I take this
opportunity to apologize in advance for any additional references which
should be included). What is supposed to be useful is the process of
identifying a certain collection of problems, and some suggestions for
solutions, with a certain philosophy in mind. The diverse collection
of workers in this field provides a diverse collection of philosophical
perspectives, driving our perception of problems as well as the choice
of solutions. Thus it seems like a valid and useful task to set out how
things look from a given philosophical point of view. Our perspective
can be summed up by saying that we would like to formalize, as quickly
and easily as possible, the largest amount of standard mathematics,
with the ultimate goal of getting to a point where it is concievable to
formalize current research mathematics in any of the standard fields.
This is a good moment to point out that one should not wish that
everybody share the same point of view, or even anything close. On the
contrary, it is good to have the widest possible variety of questions and
answers, and this is only obtained by starting with the widest possible
variety of philosophies.
We can now discuss the difference between what we might call “stan-
dard” mathematical practice, and other currents which might be di-
versely labelled “intuitionist”, “constructivist” or “non-standard”. In
the standard practice, mathematicians feel free to use whatever system
of axioms they happen to have learned about, and which they think is
currently not known to be contradictory. This can even involve mix-
ing and matching from among several axiom systems, or employing
reasoning whose axiomatic basis is not fully clear but which the math-
ematician feels could be fit into one or another axiomatic system if
necessary. This practice must be viewed in light of the role of proof as
validation of ideas: for the standard mathematician the ideas in ques-
tion have little, if anything, to do with logical foundations, and the
mathematician seeks proof results for validation—it is clear that any
generally accepted framework will be adequate for this task.
A growing number of people are interested in doing mathematics
within an intuitionist or constructive framework. They tend to be
closest to mathematical logic and computer programming, which may
be why many current computer-proving tools are to some degree explic-
itly designed with these concerns in mind. There are many motivations
for this, the principal one being deeply philosophical. Another is just
concern about consistency—you never know if somebody might come
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up with an inconsistency in any given axiomatic system (see [33] for
example). Common sense suggests that if you take a system with less
axioms, there is less chance of it, so it is possible to feel “safer” doing
mathematics with not too many axioms. A subtler motivation is the
question of knowing what is the minimal axiomatic system under which
a given result can be proven, see [54] for example. Computer-scientists
have some wonderful toys which make it possible directly to transform
a constructive proof into a computational algorithm.
The problem of computer-verified-proof in the standard framework is
a distinct major goal. Of course, if you prove something in a construc-
tive framework, you have also proven it in the standard framework but
the opposite is not the case. Integrating additional axioms such as re-
placement or choice into the theory, gives rise to a distinct optimization
problem: it is often easier to prove a given thing using the additional
axioms, which means that the structure of the theory may be differ-
ent. The notion of computer verification has already made important
contributions in many areas outside of “standard” mathematics, and
it seems reasonable to think that it should also provide an important
tool in the standard world.
One could also note that, when you get down to the nitty-gritty
details, most technical results concerning lambda calculus, including
semantics, normalization and consistency results for various (highly in-
tuitionistic) axiomatic systems, are themselves proven in a standard
mathematical framework relying on Zermelo-Frankel set theory (see
[59] for example). Thus even people who are interested in the intu-
itionist or constructive side of things might find it useful to have good
standard tools at their disposal.
One reason why computer theorem verification in the standard pure
mathematical context is not recieving enough attention is that most
pure mathematicians are unaware of the subject. This lack of awareness—
which I shared a few years ago—is truly colossal, given the literally
thousands of papers concerning the subject which have appeared in re-
cent years. Thus it seems a bit silly, but one of the goals of the present
paper is to try to spread the news.
This ongoing work is being done with a number of other researchers
at Nice: A. Hirschowitz, M. Maggesi, L. Chicli, L. Pottier. I would like
to thank them for many stimulating interactions. The referee kindly
pointed out the references [8] and [32], and several readers of the first
version sent helpful remarks and references. I would like to thank C.
Raffalli, creator of the PhoX system, who explained some of its ideas
during his visit to Nice last summer—these have been very helpful in
understanding how to approach proof documents. Special thanks are
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extended to the several members of the Coq group at INRIA, Rocqen-
court, for their continuing help during visits and on the mailing list.
From much further past, I would like to thank M. Larsen for teaching
me what little I know about computer programming.
I would like warmly to thank S. Gutt for organizing a great con-
ference, for letting me give a talk which was fairly widely off-subject,
and for suggesting a title. And of course the birthday-teenagers for
reminding us of the Sumerian numbering system [60].
2. Basic reasons
The basic goal of mechanized theorem verification is to have a lan-
guage for creating mathematical documents, such that the reasoning
can be checked by computer.1 This is of interest to pure mathemati-
cians for reasons such as the following.
2.1—To reduce the number of mistakes we make in our mathematical
work (there are lots of them! [44]).
2.2—Dealing with complicated theories—it is difficult to manage de-
velopment when there are too many things to prove (and often the
author doesn’t even know exactly what it is he needs to check).
2.3—Because of (2.1) and (2.2), nobody really has the time or energy
adequately to verify all new results, which leads to problems for pub-
lication or other timely dissemination. If articles could be validated
by machine then referees could concentrate on the question of how
interesting they are.
2.4—Black-box theories: it is sometimes useful, but currently danger-
ous, to use results without knowing how they are proven. An author
can have a certain situation in mind, and might use arguments which
work in that situation but not in other ones, but sometimes the ex-
plicit statements of results don’t adequately reflect all the hypotheses.
So future users need to understand the arguments before blindly ap-
plying the statements. An advantage of machine verification is that
the language has to be totally precise: utilization of a “black box” via
cut-and-paste rather than axiomatically leaves no room for misinter-
pretation.
2.5—Integration of many theories or points of view: it is hard for hu-
mans because of the steep learning curve for each new theory. Even
now the importation of techniques, without a full understanding of
1We ask that the machine verify the proofs supplied by the mathematician;
obviously it can help if the machine finds the proof on its own but that constitutes
a difficult, and somewhat distinct, research problem [8].
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how they work, is a little-heralded part of mathematical practice, gen-
erally glossed over because of the problems of accuracy that are posed.
With machine-verified proving these problems should in large part be
resolved and should lead to a much more diverse fabric in which differ-
ent workers develop different techniques and import the techniques of
others without needing to spend such a long time learning about the
details, leaving everyone with more energy to spend looking for new
ideas.
2.6—New forms of reasoning: now, calculations or proofs with little
motivation are ruled out by the fact that the mathematician needs
to be motivated in order to understand what is going on. Locally
unmotivated reasoning might lead to globally interesting results. A
striking example in logic is work on minimal length axioms such as [41]
[19], where much of the reasoning was found using theorem-proving
software.
2.7—The advent of more and more proofs making use of computer
calculation (non-existence of a projective plane of order 10 [34] [35],
the 4-color theorem, more recently a theorem on hyperbolicity of 3-
manifolds [21] and the Kepler conjecture [26]) represents a priori a
somewhat different use of the computer than what we are consider-
ing here. However, these proofs pose acutely the problem of verifying
logical details, and a formalized framework promises to present a sig-
nificant improvement. This issue was addressed by B. Werner in a talk
at Nice about the 4-color theorem, and has motivated Hales’ “flyspeck
project” [26].
2.8—The possibility of computer-assisted proof verification would sig-
nificantly extend the age period in which mathematicians are optimally
productive: older mathematicians tend to avert getting bogged down in
details, which often prevents full development of the continuing stream
of valid ideas.
On the whole, it is a mistake to think that computer theorem-proving
will always lag behind regular math. At some point, the advantages will
so much more than counterbalance the difficulties that mathematicians
using these tools will jump out ahead.
3. History
3.1—Cantor, Hilbert, Russell; then Go¨del and so on, worked on pro-
viding a strict logical foundation for mathematics.
Church, Rosser, Martin-Lo¨f [40], Girard [25] worked more specifically
on the logical foundations of type theory.
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3.2—Automath, the project of de Bruijn, was one of the first explicit
projects in this direction; notably he pointed out how to deal with
variables (via de Bruijn indices).
In 1977, Jutting entered all of Landau’s analysis book in the AU-
TOMATH system [31].
3.3—The first long-term project involving a very large number of peo-
ple was Mizar; it is still ongoing, and led to the Journal of Formalized
Mathematics which has been publishing articles verified in the MIZAR
system since at least 1989. This includes much basic theory but also
research articles. The mathematical orientation of the research arti-
cles is sometimes distinguished from the mainstream of what we call
standard mathematics (this is an observation but not a criticism).
3.4—More recently, a number of systems based on some kind of type
theory have been developped: HOL, Lego, Isabelle, Nuprl, Nqthm,
AC2L, and general “Boyer-Moore” theorem provers...
Coq is a project which seems relatively successful with respect to the
considerations discussed below.
An overview of very recent systems would include: Elf, Plastic, Phox,
PVS, IMPS, Ghilbert, Metamath. These and many more can be found
using an internet search engine—a little perseverance turns up an as-
tounding amount of reference material which we couldn’t begin to in-
clude here (and which is impossible to read in its entirety). A good
place to start is with meta-pages such as [79], [80].
3.5—Industrial demand, spurred in part by some well-known prob-
lems that might have been avoided with use of the appropriate proof
technology (Pentium, Ariane 5), continues to be a major impetus for
the development of proof engines. In this case, interest is oriented to-
ward proving the correctness of algorithms, integrated circuits or other
wiring diagrams, and so forth.
3.6—More and more conferences, journals, and mailing lists bear wit-
ness to the fact that fields related to computer proof verification are
really booming. Browsing the archives of mailing lists such as [81] or
[82] is a fascinating homework assignment.
3.7—In contrast we might mention that the notion of computer cal-
cuation systems, which is perhaps much better known in the world
of pure mathematics, is not quite the same thing as computer proof
verification. It is surely related, though, and is also experiencing fast
growth. Idem for the closely related field of automated deduction (see
[8] for a survey).
3.8—Some recent examples of proof developments which are of interest
to the pure mathematician are: the fundamental theorem of algebra,
by Geuvers et al [24]; R. O’Connor’s formalization of Go¨del’s theory
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[46]; the Reals and other recent libraries for Coq [63]; L. Chicli’s the-
sis about algebraic geometry [10]; the logical libraries in Isabelle [70];
Metamath’s work on Hilbert spaces [69], . . . .
A glance at this history leads to the conclusion that it now seems
like all of the ingredients are available so that we could start doing
computer theorem verification in a serious way. We just have to find
the right combination. It doesn’t seem unreasonable to think that this
moment will be seen, in retrospect, as an important juncture in the
history of mathematics.
4. Extra-mathematical considerations
It is useful to elucidate some criteria explaining what would make
the difference between a system which would or would not be used and
accepted by mathematicians. The model of mathematical typesetting
and TEXsuggests some criteria.
4.1—free: the program shouldn’t cost anything (and should be free
of any other constraints) for scientific users.
4.2—plain text: the main format of the proof document should be
a plain text file; this is to insure that nothing is hidden to the user
between the document creation and its compilation or verification, and
also to insure easy exchange of documents.
4.3—open source: the basic programming code used to specify the
syntax of the language, and to verify the proof document, should be
available to everybody. In the best case it would actually be attached
as a trailer to the proof document itself, since the program is an integral
part of the proof specification (see the discussion of archiving in the
introduction of [21]). Open source for this key part of the system brings
the guarantee that your document will be readable or compilable at any
time in the future.
4.4—reference manual: it should be possible to get started using
only the reference manual, and at the same time the manual should
answer even the most arcane questions (first-time users tend to stumble
upon arcane questions more often than one might expect, cf [82]).
4.5—cross-platform: it should be very easy to install and use on
all platforms. One of the most difficult aspects for a mathematician
getting started in this subject is just to get a system up and running
usably on whatever computer is available. The average mathematician
should be able to install the system and type out a first text file which
is then successfully verified, proving a simple mathematical lemma such
as uniqueness of the identity element in a monoid, in no more than a
couple of hours.
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4.6—modifiable: the system should be modifiable by the user, in
particular the user should choose (or invent, or re-invent) his own ax-
iomatic framework, his notational system, his proof tactics in a fully
programmable language, and so on—these things shouldn’t be hard-
wired in. In William Gibson lingo, we want something that would give
the “Turing police” nightmares. This information would be like the
notion of a macro header to a TeX file. People could exchange and
copy their header material, but could also modify it or redo it entirely.
This is very important for enabling creative research.
4.7—encourage mathematicians: the people who maintain the
system should encourage standard mathematicians to write math in
the system. This includes maintaining an archive, and publicizing the
existence of the system within the standard pure mathematical com-
munity.
4.8—attentiveness to user suggestions: pure mathematicians
are the scientists who work the most with proof, and it seems logical
that their viewpoints would be important to development of a fully
functional system. Input from pure mathematicians is likely to be
useful even in more far-flung areas of the subject such as industrial
applications. This could be seen as compensation for the requirements
that the system be free and open-source.
5. Starting tasks
The hardest part of the subject is the first basic task which needs to
be addressed: you need to form an opinion about what you are going
to want your documents to look like [56].
This task is of course first and foremost treated by the system de-
signers. However, even within the framework of a given system, the
mathematician has to address this task too, in determining the style
he will use.
It is subject to a number of constraints and hazards.
5.1—Everything you write down has to have an absolutely well-defined
and machine-determinable meaning.
5.2—One must write things in a reasonably economical way, in partic-
ular we need a reasonable system of notation for the standard mathe-
matical objects which are going to be manipulated.
5.3—It is better if any difficulties which are encountered, have actual
mathematical significance. An example of a difficulty which doesn’t
seem to have much real mathematical significance arises in type theory
when we have two types A and B, with an element a:A and a known (or
supposed) equality A=B. It often (depending on the type system being
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used) requires additional work in order to be able to say that a:B.
To the extent possible, the pure mathematician will want to choose a
format in which any such hurdle is seamlessly cured.
5.4—At least a part of what is written should be comprehensible,
preferably upon simple inspection of the pure text file.
5.5—potential problem: it is quite possible (and maybe even gen-
erally the case) to invent notation which suggests a meaning different
from the actual meaning. When you prove a given statement, did you
really prove what you thought you did?
Unfortunately there is no way for the computer to verify this part.
The conclusion is that we require human comprehension of the defini-
tions, and of the statements of the theorems (the main ones, at least).
This imperious requirement is stronger than the natural desire also to
understand the proofs.
5.6—Experience suggests that the proofs, in their explicit and verifi-
able form, actually contain too much information and the reader will
not really want completely to understand them. Indeed the origin of
the whole project is the fact that we aren’t able to follow the details
of our proofs. Rather one might ask that two particular aspects stand
out: the general strategy, and the unexpected main steps.
6. How it works
We describe in brief some of the salient points of the Coq v8.0 sys-
tem [63] currently used by the author. A number of other recent sys-
tems are similar. Aside from the geographical reason for my choice of
system, one can point out that Coq scores pretty well (but naturally
with room for improvement) on the above lists of desiderata. 2
6.1—Some natural considerations lead to the idea of using type theory
as a basis for mathematical verification [40]. To start with, notice that
we want to manipulate various sorts of objects, first and foremost the
mathematical statements themselves. Although perhaps not strictly
necessary, it is also very important to be able directly to manipulate the
mathematical entities appearing in the statements, be they numbers,
sets, or other things. To deal with our entities (which will be denoted
by expressions entered into the text file), we need function application
(f x) and function-definition
fun x => (... x ... x ....).
2If the makers of other systems feel impelled at this point to say “hey, our system
does just as well or better”, the main point I am trying to make is: That’s great!
Try to get us working on it!
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This combination of operators yields the lambda calculus. The notion
of β-reduction is that if
f:= fun x =>(... x ... x ....)
then for any expression y, the application (f y) should reduce to
(... y ... y ....). It is natural to ask that the computer take into
account this reduction automatically.
6.2—The first famous difficulty is that if f:= fun x =>x x then
(f f)= (fun x =>x x) f
β
→ (f f)
β
→ (f f) . . . . Thus the β-reduction
operation can loop.
The solution is the notion of type introduced by Russell: every “term”
(i.e. allowable expression, even a hypothetical or variable one) has a
“type”. The meta-relation that a term x has type X is written x:X. The
λ construction (construction of functions) is abstraction over a given
type: we have to write
f:= fun (x:A)=>(... x ... x ....)
where A is supposed to designate a type. Furthermore the expression
on the right is required to be allowable, i.e. well-typed, under the
constraint that x has type A.
6.3—The Church-Rosser theorem states that:
—In typed λ-calculus, β-reduction terminates; also calculation of the
typing relation terminates.
The verification program (such as Coq) basically implements this
calculation. The fact that it is sure to terminate is a considerable
advantage for the end-user: you are sure that the computer will stop
and say either ok or no. And if “no” you were the one who made the
mistake.
6.4—The product operation Π: in the above expression, what is the
type of f? We need a new operator Π written as f:forall (x:A), B x
where
B:=fun (x:A) => "the type of (...x ... x ....) when x has type A"
(recall that the allowability restriction on f requires that this expres-
sion (B x) exist, and in fact it is calculable).
6.5—Sorts: What is the type of a type? We are manipulating the
types themselves as terms, so we are required to specify the type of a
type. This is known as a “sort” (or in some literature, a “kind”). In
current theories there are just a few, for example:
Prop, the type of propositions or statements; and
Type_i, the type of types which are thought of as sets (with a “universe
index” i, see below), so an X:Type_i corresponds to a collection of
objects, and an x:X corresponds to an element of the collection.
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6.6—Curry-Howard: In many (but not all) type-theory based sys-
tems, the notion of mathematical proof comes out for free from the
type-checking algorithm. This is known as the “Curry-Howard prin-
ciple”: propositions are realized as types, which the reader can think
of as being sets with either zero or one element. Proving a proposi-
tion amounts to giving an element of the corresponding type, so the
proof-checking mechanism is the same as the mechanism implementing
the Church-Rosser algorithm refered to above, determining whether a
given expression is indeed a term in the propositional type claimed by
the mathematician. As suggested by the notation, the product opera-
tion Π corresponds to the logical “forall” in propositional calculus (a
product of zero-or-one-element sets is nonempty if and only if all of the
component sets are nonempty).
The above system corresponds to Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory [40]. One
can imagine theories with a more complicated diagram of sorts, which
is probably an interesting research topic for computer scientists.
6.7—inductive objects: An interesting feature of a number of sys-
tems including Coq is the notion of inductive objects, which allows us
automatically to create recursive datatypes. Since understanding and
calculating with recursive datatypes is what the computer does best,
it can be good to make use of this feature. It is often the only viable
way of getting the computer hitched onto the calculational aspects of
a problem. (This might change, notably with the advent of connec-
tivity between theorem-proving systems and calculation systems.) We
won’t go into any further detail on the basic structure or functionality
of inductive definitions; the reader is referred to the reference manual
of [63].
7. Universes
In order to get a coherent system (i.e. one without any known
proofs of False : Prop) the sorts Type_i have to be distinguished
by universe levels i, with Type_i : Type_(i+1) whereas Type_i ⊂
Type_(i+1) also. In the set-theoretical semantics, these universe lev-
els can be thought of as being Grothendieck universes, see [57]. The
incoherency of the declaration Type:Type without universe indices was
shown in [25]. Nonetheless, in some type-theoretical programs such as
Coq, a vestige of Type:Type is preserved by a neat, but quirky, mecha-
nism known as typical ambiguity (see [17]). The user just writes Type
and the computer makes sure that it is possible to assign indices to
all occurences of this word in such a way that the required inequalities
hold. If this is not possible, then a Universe Inconsistency error is
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raised. Thus, the user writes his text file as if he were using the incon-
sistent Type:Type system, and the verification program then verifies
that no unallowable advantage was taken.
Curiously enough, this leads to a phenomenon that looks for all the
world to me like quantum mechanics.3 Suppose you prove A -> B (i.e.
“A implies B”) in one text file, and you separately prove B -> C in
another. You might think you have proven A -> C. However, when
you merge the two files together to get a proof of A->C, the verification
program might come up with a Universe Inconsistency error if the
constraints on the universe indices which are generated by the proofs
of A->B and B->C, while separately satisfiable, are not satisfiable by
any common assignment.
This phenomenon can be seen as a “disturbance due to measure-
ment”. If we think of A, B and C as measuring posts along a lab bench
(such as polarized glass panes, say A is horizontal, B is at 45 degrees
and C is vertical) then the result of starting with a photon polarized
as A, doing the proof of A-> B and then “measuring” (i.e. stopping
the text file and saying “wow, we just proved B”), then inputting the
photon polarized as B into the next proof of B -> C, we get a photon
polarized as C in the output; whereas if we do the whole proof starting
from A and trying to get out C, no proof-photon comes through!
In [53] qua.v, a simple example of this phenomenon is given using
Russell’s paradox, assuming the excluded middle and using eqT_rect
via Maggesi’s proof of JMeq_eq [39] [14]. As pointed out by H. Boom [7]
it is possible (although more complicated) to do the same thing without
axioms other than the basic Coq system, using the Burali-Forti paradox
[25] [5].
It is important to note, then, that as long as the typical ambiguity
mechanism is in place, it is not allowable to prove a theorem in one
file and import it as an axiom in another file. It is actually required
that the proofs of component pieces of the argument be imported by
cut-and-paste (2.4). Luckily the system has a Require command that
does this automatically without having to copy the files.
Questions about “universe polymorphism” lead to some of the most
difficult notational problems. The following discussion comes from
work of Marco Maggesi, who is also working on solutions to the prob-
lem possibly by implementing the thesis of Judicae¨l Courant [13]. As
was pointed out in [17], the basic example is the distinction between
small categories and big categories, in other words assigning universe
levels in the definition of category. Ideally, polymorphism should be
3This might be related to [49].
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extendable to definitions such as this. In the absence of such a mech-
anism, we seem to have to rewrite Category_i once for each level i.
This can lead to a nightmare of notation, for example do we need to
distinguish between a comp_sm for composition in a small category, and
comp_bg for a big category? If this seems annoying but doable, notice
that we then need Functor_ij for functors from a Category_i to a
Category_j; and composing them, and so forth!
One of my main motivations for going back to a purely set-theoretic
approach (cf 10.3, 10.4 below) is to try to avoid the above problems as
much as possible. However, it seems that there will always be a thresh-
old between the objects we are willing to manipulate and the bigger
ones we would prefer not to manipulate, and looking at categories of
the smaller objects inevitably bumps up against the bigger ones. Un-
til someone comes up with an adequate general solution (perhaps the
ideas in [17] are relevant) we are left with little choice but to live with
the situation.
8. Exotic versus regular math
The system described above applies to a wide variety of situations,
problems and logics.
8.1—Intuitionism: One of the main utilizations of this type of system
is to verify intuitionistic logic. In fact it is difficult to imagine taking
a complicated argument and trying to insure, as a human reader, that
the proof didn’t use the excluded middle in some hidden place in the
middle. In this sense, computer verification seems crucially important
and allows a much more serious approach to the field.
8.2—Impredicative sort: in previous versions of Coq the sort Set
was declared as impredicative,4 in other words if X:Set then the product
type
Set -> X := (Y:Set)X
is classified as having type Set. Nonetheless elements X:Set behave
somewhat like sets: strong elimination is allowed, so that constructors
in inductive sets are distinct. The intuition behind this situation is
that the constructive functions on a constructive set themselves form
a constructive set too. Thus these considerations are closely related to
the constructive or algorithmic aspects of mathematics. Hugo Herbe-
lin points out that this can lead to some unexpected and fascinating
things, such as a proof which extracts to an algorithm where nobody
can understand how it works [28].
4In v8.0 the impredicativity is turned off and can apparently be turned back on
by an option.
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8.3—Caution: the existence of an impredicative but strongly elimina-
tory sort is somewhat “orthogonal” to standard mathematics, in that it
contradicts most choice axioms you can imagine, even the much weaker
dependent choice axioms [22] [11]. Perhaps not all, though: David
Nowak in [45] proposed doing the axiom of choice for the Ensembles
library, which means looking at a function associating to any predicate
P:X->Prop another predicate (choice P):X->Prop with the property
that if P is nonempty then (choice P) is a singleton. One conjec-
tures that this version is consistent even with an impredicative Set.
Nowak’s version is difficult to use in practice, and leads to a situation
where the only objects which are manipulated are predicates. This
nullifies much of the advantage of using a type-theory framework. So,
for implementing classical mathematics we prefer working without the
impredicativity.
8.4—Logic in a topos: recall from Moerdijk-MacLane [43] that one
way of providing a model for certain intuitionistic logical systems is
by looking at logic in a topos other than the topos of sets. One can
say this differently (as they do in the book) by saying that any logical
reasoning which is expressed solely in a limited intuitionist formulation,
applies internally to logic within any topos. One can formulate as a
conjecture, that this principle extends to the full intuitionist logical
system as implemented in Coq:
Conjecture The λ − Π calculus with universes and inductive objects
as described above and implemented in Coq, applies to logic within a
Grothendieck topos.
It would be a generalization of the principles set out in [43]. Some
part of it may already be known, see Streicher [55] as well as the ref-
erences therein (and indeed the formulation of the question appears
to have been known to workers in Synthetic Domain Theory for some
time [18] [52]). It is not immediate, for example, to see how to imple-
ment the sorts Type_i. A caveat might also be in order because recent
versions of Coq include some inductive principles such as False_rect
or eqT_rect which might not be realizable in the internal logic of a
topos. So, the above statement is really just intended to point out that
it is an interesting research problem to see how far we can extend the
internal-logic principle from [43].
As an example of how this type of thing might actually lead to useful
results for standard mathematics, one can use the full flexibility of the
Coq implementation of type theory to define internal cohomology within
the logic (this is done for H1 in [53] h1.v). If this could be applied to a
Grothendieck topos, it would show that cohomology in the topos was
an internal logical construction. Internal algebraic geometry inside the
THEOREM PROVING 15
topos of sheaves on the big fpqc site takes on a particularly nice form
very close to the original Italian geometry, for example affine n-space
is quite literally just the cartesian power of the ground field kn.
8.5—The Hodge conjecture: The statement of the Hodge con-
jecture implies that the problem of saying whether a given topological
cycle is algebraic, is decidable. Same for the question of whether a
given cycle is Hodge (i.e. vanishing of the Hodge integrals). This
might be considered as a logical analogue of Deligne’s observation that
the Hodge conjecture implies that Hodge cycles are absolute. The per-
tinance of calculatory methods showed up recently in [51]. It could be
interesting to investigate further, for example does Deligne’s proof of
[16] imply the decidability for abelian varieties? And in exactly which
level of intuitionist logic would the decidability hold? What are the
consequences of this decidability given already by the Lefschetz (1, 1)-
theorem? What happens internally in a topos? Could one obtain a
counterexample to the Hodge conjecture by showing that in some cases
the question is undecideable?
——————–
8.6—So there are undoubtedly lots of fun things to look at in these
exotic reaches, but they don’t really have anything to do with our
original goal of implementing, as quickly as possible, a large amount
of standard mathematics. More generally, my experience is that any
“brilliant gadget” seems predestined to be a bad idea. Boring as it may
seem, we have just to plod along in a mundane but systematic way.
9. Typed versus untyped style
One of the central questions in the theory has been whether to im-
pose a strict type system, or whether to relax the typing constraints.
There are some very interesting threads of discussion about the issue
in the mailing lists, particularly [81] following the postings [36] and
[29]. It is interesting to note that in the first thread of discussion,
Lamport (forwarded by Rudnicki [36]) offered the viewpoint that the
untyped style was better than the typed one. He was promptly refuted
by almost all the subsequent messages. A year later when Holmes [29]
asked what options people generally used to answer the question, al-
most everybody replied that the untyped style was obviously the way
to go. Unfortunately, this seems to have marked the end of interesting
discussion on the QED mailing list [81]. At about the same time the
Coq system (where typed language was systematic) started picking up
speed: the announcement of Coq Version 5.10 is among the last group
of messages in Volume 3 of [81].
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The published version of [36] is [37], issued from a combination of
Lamport’s original note and a rebuttal by L. Paulson. This discus-
sion and the discussion in J. Harrison [27] are excellent references for
the multiple facets of the question which we don’t attempt further to
reproduce here.
The distinction between the typed and the untyped style is generally
seen as related to the axiom of choice. In the absence of the axiom of
choice (in particular, in any sort of constructive environment) it is much
more natural to keep a lot of type information, looking at the values of
functions only when they are well defined and make sense. On the other
hand, the axiom of choice provides a nice way to implement aspects
characteristic of an untyped environment such as function evaluation
which is defined everywhere [37].
Some authors make a distinction between choice and dependent
choice, the latter stating only that we can choose a function whose
values lie in a family of single-element types. By [22] [11] this weaker
form poses the same problems vis-a-vis a constructive axiom such as
impredicativity of Set. Furthermore it generates a lot more proof obli-
gations since one has to prove unicity whenever it is used. For this
reason we don’t pay too much attention to the distinction, and look
directly at the full axiom, even a strong Hilbertian form involving an
ǫ-function.
10. Options for doing set theory
Sets are the most basic building blocks entering into the definition
of various mathematical objects. On the other hand, as we have seen
above, natural considerations about general mathematical theories lead
to type theory as the framework for the system as a whole. The most
critical decision about document style is therefore the way the notion
of a set is encoded in the ambient type theory.
We will review some of the most prominent options. These follow
the contours of the “typed versus untyped” discussion.
10.1—Interpret sets as types. Benjamin Werner’s paper provid-
ing the justification for the λ − Π calculus with inductive definitions
[57] rests on a semantics, i.e. assignation of meaning to the formal
symbols of the theory, where X:Type_i corresponds to a set in the ith
Grothendieck universe Ui, and functions such as constructed by the
λ operation fun x:A =>( ... x ... ) are represented by sets which
are the graphs of the corresponding set-theoretic function. We can use
this semantics as our method for interpreting sets, namely when we
want to talk about a set we just take any X:Type. In this option we
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make full use of the notion of dependent types, see C. McBride [4].
The following example shows how we would define the type of groups.
It uses the Record construction which is a special inductive definition
corresponding to an explicit list (of objects possibly depending on the
previous ones).
Record Group : Type_(i+1) := {
elt:Type_i;
op : elt -> elt -> elt;
id : elt;
inv : elt -> elt;
assoc : forall x y z:elt,(op (op x y) z) = (op x (op y z));
left_id : forall x:elt, (op id x) = x;
right_id : forall x:elt, (op x id) = x;
left_inv : forall x:elt, (op (inv x) x) = id;
right_inv : forall x:elt, (op x (inv x)) = id
}.
With this definition, if G:Group then (elt G):Type_i is the “set”
of elements of G.
The advantage of this viewpoint is that it is generally quite easy to
understand what is going on. You the uninitiated reader didn’t have
any trouble reading the previous definition, and could by cut and paste
give the analogous definition of, say, Ring, right?
One of the drawbacks with this point of view is that if H:Group too,
and if for some reason we know G=H, we have problems interpreting
elements of G as being the same as elements of H. For example it is not
legal to write
forall x y z:(elt G), (op H (op H x y) z) = (op G x (op G y z))
(if rare at the outset, this sort of thing tends to come up in the middle of
proofs). The problem is alleviated by the recent inclusion in Coq of the
“transport” function eqT_rect, the utilisation of which is best accom-
panied by a systematic exploitation of the JMeq equality proposed by
McBride [4]. This doesn’t make the problem go away entirely, though.
This point of view adheres pretty closely to the “typed” side of the
discussion in the previous section. An appropriate choice axiom could
allow us to extend function definitions to larger types, whenever a
default is available. Unfortunately this implies a distinction between
empty and nonempty types. Some have made more exotic proposals
to include a default element ⊥ in every type (this is based on work of
Scott [50], and was mentionned in the replies to [29]). I haven’t looked
closely at it, mostly for fear of a large number of proof obligations of
the form x 6=⊥, and because it obviates the advantage that we can
easily understand what is going on. Also because the guy in the office
next door talks about it so much.
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To close this subsection we also mention another more subtle draw-
back, which might really be the main problem. There is a very slight
shift in universe indexing, compared with what we are used to in set
theory. In the above Record if we want the underlying set (elt g) to
be in the universe Type_i, the type Group is forced to be in the uni-
verse Type_(i+1). In general, a set at a given universe level will also
have elements at that level. Thus, a priori, the elements g:Group are
to be considered (even though this statement doesn’t have any precise
technical meaning) as being in the (i+ 1)-st level. This contrasts with
set theory where, if g is a group whose underlying set (elt g) is in the
i-th universe, then g is represented by an ordered uple which is also in
the i-th universe.
10.2—Setoids. From a constructive point of view, the notion of a
quotient can be problematic because an equivalence relation need not
be decidable, so when defining an object as a carrier modulo a relation,
the carrier might be constructive or computational but the quotient less
so. Another problem is that the classical construction of a quotient as
a set of equivalence classes can pose problems in certain intuitionist
frameworks (imagine doing that internally in a topos, for example).
For these (or perhaps other) reasons a much-favored implementation
of sets is as setoids (cf the Setoid libraries in Coq). A setoid is a
carrier type together with an equivalence relation. We can think of
them as quotient sets without adding additional axioms. One major
drawback is that there is a lot of extra stuff to prove, basically that all
operations defined on the level of the carrier type are compatible with
the equivalence relation.
For standard mathematics, we don’t really need the setoid viewpoint
since we are willing to add in all of the axiomatic baggage which makes
the usual theory of quotients go through. What is useful is to know
that such structures exist, are natural, and have been studied, because
they occasionally show up uninvited.
10.3—Introduce a type E of sets. In this viewpoint, the type-level
is considered as the meta-language of mathematical expressions, and
we introduce maybe some parameters
Parameter E : Type.
Parameter inc : E -> E -> Prop.
Here E is for “Ensemble” and inc is the elementhood relation. One
can then go on to suppose all of the usual axioms in set theory, and
proceed from there. For example the definition of the subset relation
becomes
Definition sub := [a,b:E](c:E)(inc c a) -> (inc c b).
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A development of set theory using this type of viewpoint was done
by Guillaume Alexandre in his Coq contribution “An axiomatisation
of intuitionistic Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory” (1995) [2]. This version
is also quite analogous to the foundations of the MIZAR system [73],
and has been developped rather deeply in the “ZF” logic in the Isabelle
system [70].
One can even create such an E using an inductive definition and a
quotient, see Aczel [1] and Werner [57]:
Inductive Ens : Type := sup : (A:Type)(A->Ens)->Ens.
This is a carrier type, bigger than what we actually think of as Ens
because an equivalence relation of extensional equality is defined (thus,
E should actually be thought of as a setoid and to get a type we would
have to take the quotient). Once we have the basic axioms, which
in these constructions may require supposing their counterpart axioms
on the type-theory side [57], the further development of the theory
doesn’t require knowing about the construction, so in this sense it is
conceptually easier just to take E as a parameter.
In theories of this option, sets are terms of type E, but not themselves
types, and elementhood is just a propositional relation on E. This is
contrasted with the type-theoretical interpretation (10.1) where the
relation x:X is meta to the theory, not actually accessible from within,
and is decided by the computer.
This would seem at first glance to be much less powerful than version
(10.1) where sets are types. In a certain sense that’s true, but in some
other ways it is actually more powerful. The fact that the elementhood
relation is a propositional function in the theory allows us to manipulate
it mathematically. The problem referred to above about elements of
sets which are equal, goes away: if a=b and if x:E then the propositions
(inc x a) and (inc x b) are equal since they are functions of a=b.
Inside proofs, the fact that a certain term has a certain type is replaced
by the statement that a certain set is an element of another set; in the
first case the knowledge is required at the start because otherwise the
statement will be rejected by the type-checker, but in the second case
the proof can be deferred into a separate branch of the proof tree.
If we further add an appropriately strong version of the axiom of
choice (basically Hilbert’s ǫ) then we get an even better situation [36]
[37] where function evaluation can be defined as the operation which
to any f,x:E assigns a choice of y:E such that the pair (pair x y)
is contained in f, if such a y exists (or a default value if no such
exists). In fact, if we write down all of the axioms in this general
spirit of everywhere-definedness, then everything that follows will be
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everywhere-defined too, and we are no longer bothered with objects
depending on proofs of propositions.
The main disadvantage of the purely set-theoretical approach is that
we have lost any possibility for the computer directly to compute on
sets, because computation requires specific knowledge about the induc-
tive structure of the type containing a given term and our E no longer
has any inductive structure. (This might well be alleviated using the
direct constructions of [1] and [57], though, a thought-experiment that
starts off the next option.)
10.4—Combine 10.1 and 10.3. In the Aczel-Werner type construc-
tions [57] one can construct a set i.e. term x:E whenever one has a type
A:Type together with a realization function for its elements A -> E.
Imagine that we want to realize as a set an inductive type say
Inductive nat : Type := O : nat | S : nat -> nat.
To do this we would need to construct an injection nat -> E. In this
particular case it is natural to do so because the construction
∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}, . . .
played an important historical role in the beginning. However, if we
try to do the same for, say, a free monoid, few people ever really worry
about the details of how to do it. This requirement would therefore
seem to qualify as something that doesn’t have any real mathematical
significance: we only care about the universal properties of an inductive
type, not about how it is actually realized.
In Werner’s paper [57], he describes briefly how to realize inductive
types as sets, and consequently how to realize every type as a set.
So, let’s just abstract out this process and suppose, with a parameter,
that we know how to do it but we don’t care what it is. We get a
situation where, combining (10.1) and (10.3), sets are types, but also
the elements of sets are realized as sets themselves—which after all is
the bedrock assumption of classical set theory.
This is the viewpoint which is developped in [53]. We start by putting
Definition E:= Type.
Parameter R : (x:E)x->E.
Definition inc := [a,x:E](exists [b:x](R b) = a).
Thus, we identify the notion of set with the notion of type. The pa-
rameter R is the realization function which says that the elements of a
set/type are themselves sets. The elementhood relation inc is defined
using R by saying that a ∈ x iff there exists a term b of type x whose
realization is a.
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Figure 1. Inheritance for the notion of Lie group
We assume a certain number of axioms such as choice (in the form
of a Hilber ǫ-function) and replacement. We can then go on to develop
set theory for E just as would be done in option (10.3) above. On
the other hand, we can calculate with inductive types and other type-
theory features, useful among other things to establish a notational
system.
11. Inheritance
Consider the notion of Lie group. This fits into at least 4 distinct
(plus one overlapping) inheritance threads as shown in Figure 1. The
three rightmost threads are formally similar, however the ringed spaces
in question are different, and the topological spaces for the two middle
threads are the same but different from the (Zariski) topological space
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in the “algebraic variety” thread. One could identify other inheri-
tance strings, and note that there are intricate relationships between
them, for example the structure sheaf of the ringed space underlying
the complex variety is a subsheaf of the structure sheaf of the ringed
space underlying the differentiable manifold, and the set underlying
the usual topological space in the first threads is the subset of closed
points in the set underlying the Zariski topological space.
If G is a Lie group, informally we tend to use the letter “G” for any
and all of the above things and more.
On the other hand, the details of these inheritance relations would
have precisely to be spelled out in any computer verification system.
Letting the same letter “G” mean any of an amorphous mass of
notions, represents a huge collection of notational shortcuts. While
clearly impossible to keep all of them, it should be possible to keep
some. This could lead to some difficult choices: how to decide which
parts to keep and which parts to relegate to a more complicated nota-
tion. And in any case, how do we minimize the amount of additional
notation necessary to make these shortcuts precise?
The example of a Lie group is deliberately complex in order to illus-
trate the problem. However, it comes up to varying degrees in pretty
much all of modern mathematical practice.
12. Perspectives
We now outline a sketch of what some part of the further develop-
ment of machine-verified mathematics might look like. This could start
with any of a number of basic supports such as [70], [73], [63], [69], . . . ,
some of which are already quite far along.
Attached to the original preprint version of the present paper was
the start of a development along the lines of option (10.4) above. The
idea of notative sets as being functions on strings, first brought up in
[37], was implemented. We get a primitive kind of inheritance, in which
different structures corresponding to different strings can coexist in the
same object, and the functions extracting these operations from a given
object are uniform throughout. Thus for example the theory of groups
and the theory of topological spaces would both apply immediately to
topological groups. The explanatory section and source code have now
been spun off as a separate preprint [53].
The proof development accompanying [53] now treats the notions
of ordinal and cardinal. The next part which needs to be addressed
would contain the notion of finiteness, various facts about finite sets
(notably that any automorphism of a finite set decomposes as a product
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of transpositions); also various notions of collection or list of objects;
etc. The theory of transpositions should help for defining multi-term
summation in an abelian monoid.
Most objects are constructed with a single common variable, denoted
(U a), thought of as the “underlying set” of a. Morphisms between
such objects can be considered as some of the maps between underlying
sets. This makes it possible to develop a certain amount of categorical
machinery at once for all these types of objects.
With this in mind, we can define monoids, groups, rings, algebras,
modules; categories, eventually with Grothendieck topologies; presheaves
(and sheaves if the category has a g.t.); ordered sets; topological spaces
also eventually with other structures so that one could define topolog-
ical groups and so on.
The counting system has to be extended to the numbering system.
We can import much of the beautiful development of Peano arithmetic
already in the Coq system, as well as the ZArith library containing a
logarithmically fast implementation of integers. Then we need to define
the rationals as a localization of the integers (and for this we might as
well call upon the general notion of localization of a ring). Then we can
define the reals as the set of Dedekind cuts of the rationals. It is not
clear whether it is better to import the real number results from the
existing Coq library, or to redo a substantial portion, since our approach
using things like the axiom of choice, and an untyped point of view,
might give substantial simplification here (as opposed to the case of
elementary arithmetic where we wouldn’t expect any such benefit).
Once we have the reals (and therefore the complex numbers too) we
need to establish the basic facts about the topology on these spaces,
and along the way note that this opens up the definition of metric
space, so we can do the basic facts about metric spaces. This could
eventually lead to stuff for analysis such as Hilbert or Banach spaces,
and all of the basic theorems of analysis. This is not necessarily urgent
although it would be required for the implementation of Hodge theory.
A parallel project is to develop abstract commutative and linear
algebra as well as group theory and field theory. For large parts, these
theories don’t need the real numbers. As pointed out above, the notion
of localization would be convenient to have for the construction of the
rational numbers. In general, it would be good to start by developing
the basic commutative algebra such as is assumed in the beginning of
Hartshorne. Once we have a reasonable control over the basic notions
of ring, algebra, module etc. then much of commutative algebra can
be done without any new notational worries.
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Linear algebra could lead to a rather extensive development of the
theory of matrices, matrix groups, and group representations.
Again in parallel, we need the notions of presheaf and sheaf over a
topological space. Here it seems economical to take the abstract point
of view and develop directly the notion of sheaf on a Grothendieck
site. Along the way the notion of presheaf on a category yields the
notion of simplicial set which forms the basis for homotopy theory.
The notion which is directly useful for starting out is that of sheaf on a
topological space, so we need a construction going between a space and
its corresponding Grothendieck site of open sets. It is unclear whether
we would prefer using the full abstract notion of point for a site (or
maybe a topos?—but this may lead to universe problems) or whether it
is better just to look at the germ for a presheaf on a topological space.
In any case, here some ad hoc argumentation is necessary, because we
would like the germ of a presheaf to be endowed with the same type
of structure as the presheaf; the variety of different types of structures
we want to preserve means that it is probably more difficult to come
up with a single general theory than just to do each one separately.
Up to here, most of what is listed above has already been treated
in one way or another, in at least some user-contributions for at least
some of the systems listed in the bibliography. Left open is the problem
of coalescing everything together.
Once we have these various theories, we can put them together to
obtain the notion of locally ringed space modelled on a certain type of
model space. Depending on which model spaces we look at, we can ob-
tain the notions of differentiable manifold, complex analytic manifold,
or algebraic variety (scheme). Laurent Chicli has done a formaliza-
tion up to the notion of (affine) scheme in his thesis [10], using setoids
(option (10.2) above).
At this point, perhaps one of the first things to do would be the com-
parison constructions going from schemes (over C) to complex mani-
folds to differentiable manifolds. We should then be able to construct
projective space, projective subvarieties, various differentiable mani-
folds, and so on. Another thing to do will be exterior algebra and
differential calculus over a manifold.
It would be interesting to try things out by applying this to the case
of Lie groups, and seeing how far into the theory one can go.
Integration is probably the next place where we will run into a major
notational problem. This is because the verb “to integrate” spans a
highly diverse and notationally wide-ranging collection of ideas: there
is simple Riemann (or Lebesgue) integration on the real line (already
implemented in [15]), but also more general integration of a measure,
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or integration of a differential form over various things such as a man-
ifold, or a smooth chain; or finally integration of currents and the like.
These different notions have a very high degree of overlap, however
they are not quite the same, and they require differing notations and
even differing levels of notational complexity.
With the theory of integration would come the possibility of get-
ting at the fundamental properties of analysis on manifolds. At this
point we will need the theory of Hilbert and Banach spaces (already
implemented in [69]), and we should be able to do the basic theorems
such as Stokes’ theorem, the Poincare´ lemma and de Rham’s theorem,
Hartogs’ theorem for complex manifolds, the mean value theorem for
harmonic functions, which gives the maximum principle and unicity of
analytic continuation, the representation (and regularity) of cohomol-
ogy by harmonic forms, leading up to the Hodge decomposition for the
cohomology of a complex Ka¨hler manifold (to take an example from
my own research interests). At this stage we will also want to have the
basic notions of homotopy theory available.
Once all of the above is well in hand, we would be able to state and
prove a first theorem which is a really nontrivial application of this
wide swath of mathematics: the fact that the first (or any odd) Betti
numbers of complex algebraic varieties are even.
We should then be able to start looking at more advanced things go-
ing toward current research problems. One area where we can expect
important gains is homological or homotopical algebra, for example J.
Lipman points out that it would be good to formalize the computations
in duality theory such as [3]. More geometrical directions could include
for example the construction of moduli spaces of vector bundles, con-
nexions and so forth. Or the investigation of existence problems for
connexions over higher dimensional varieties which could at first be
viewed just as matrix problems in linear algebra.
Some day in the not-too-distant future we will have a computer-
verified proof that the curvature of the classifying space for variations
of Hodge structure in the horizontal directions is negative, and all that
it entails.
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